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Developing countries can increase their national saving rate best
by increasing government saving.  The most effective way to
increase national saving is through a permanent tax hike, a cut in
current public spending, and a macroeconomic framework in
which inflation is low and incentives are predictable.
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Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel  analyze  the effec-  saving  by only 16 to 50 cents. Pennanent  cuts in
tiveness  of public  policy  in raising  saving  in  public spending  reduce  private  saving  by 47 to
developing  countries,  drawing  on estimates  of  50 cents.
consumption  functions  for 13 developing  coun-
tries. First, they  provide  evidence  from time-  Not surprisingly,  a higher  pennanent  tax
series and panel  data on how liquidity  constraints  hike has less of an effect on private  saving  than a
affect  consumption  functions.  This suggests  that  transitory  tax hike. For each $1 increase  in
a rise in public saving  does not produce  an equal  permanent  taxes,  private saving  declines  only 23
reduction  in private  saving.  to 26 cents. Increasing  only current-period  taxes
reduces  private saving  between  48 and 65 cents.
Second,  they  present  direct evidence  of the
link between  private  consumption  and govem-  Increasing  taxes and improving  tax compli-
ment saving  - based on a more general  con-  ance are  the most efficient  ways  to reduce  public
sumption  specification  implemented  for 1980-87  deficits  when  traditional  tax revenue  is low and
country  panel data. These  show that indirect  inefficient  tax levies (such  as the inflation  tax)
effects  of public  policies  on private saving  - are high and widespread.  Finally,  public  policy
through  changes  in domestic  inflation  and real  can help raise  private  savings  and make  their use
interest  rates  - are negligible. But cuts in  more  efficient  by providing  a macroeconomic
current  public spending  and current  tax hikes  framework  in which  inflation  is low and incen-
significantly  affect  private  savings.  tives are  predictable.
Increasing  public saving  by cutting  current-
period  public  expenditures  by $1 reduces  private
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"The most direct tool at  the  government's  disposal for
altering  the  national  saving  rate  is changes  in the  level  of
public saving  or  dissaving  ...  The  potentially  direct
linkages  between  the rare  of public  saving  and the level  of
national  saving  suggest  that  if  altering  the  rate  of  national
saving is a policy  goal, this goal should  be assigned  to
deficit  policy"  (L.  Summers  (1985),  pp.  8-9).
In  the  late  19709  and  early  1980s  low  international  real  interest  rates  and
easy access to private capital markets facilitated  a  large expansion in
developing  country  domestic  expenditures  that resulted  in persistent  current
account  deficits  and  accumulation  of  large  external  debts. Public  external  debt
accumulation  in  many  cases  was  much above  what can  be accounted  for  by current
account  deficits,  as  public  sector  borrowing  also  financed  capital  flights.  When
voluntary commercial  lending  was  severely  curtailed  --  following  Mexico's
difficulties  in  serving  its  debt  --  the  boom  transformed  into  a  major  crisis  in
many  countries. When after  1982  foreign  borrowing  was  not  more available,  the
private  and  public  sector  deficits  (investments  minus savings)  had to be cut
accordingly.
The reduction  in foreign saving  was associated  in many cases with a
recession  and a decline  in national  saving. The public  saving  to GDP ratio
dropped  as the  public  sector  had  to cope  with higher  foreign  interest  payments
resulting from increased debt  stocks, higher intereet rates, and  real
devaluations.  At the  same  time  revenues  fell  together  with income.  The  decline
in the  private  saving  to  GDP  ratio  followed  from  partial  consumption  smoothing
during  the  cyclical  downturn. The  final  result  was lower  saving,  a recession,
higher  real  interest  rates  and  a  collapse  in  investment.
Investment rates declined for  several reasons.  Public investment
contracted  because  of the  deterioration  in  fiscal  conditions  and  the  incapacity
or unwillingness  of governments  to reduce current expenditures.  Private
investment  declined  because  of lower  or negative  growth,  higher  real interest
rates  and  an increase  in  uncertainty  associated  to  the  macroeconomic  crisis  and
initial  doubts  about  the sustainibility  of the change  in relative  prices  and-2-
incentives.
For countries to resume sustainable growth, major distortions have to be
reduced and investment rates will need to increase from the depressed 1983-85
levels. Recovery  of investment  requires  a  predictable  macroeconomic  environment,
stable incentives and higher saving rates at a given real interest rate.  As it
is  most likel! that foreign saving  will remain low in the foreseeable future, a
major effort to increase national saving  will be needed.
Empirical evidence shows that private saving rates are usually not very
sensitive to changes in macroeconomic and financial policies.  Raising real
interest rates often induces shifts in portfolio compositior but has ambiguous
or  minor effects on saving.  However, private saving rates  are very sensitive  to
the economic cycle as a result of consumption smoothing.
Public sector saving rates can  be increased  more directly through reforms
of public enterprises, local government finances and the central government
budget.  However, if  private saving  rates  are negatively affected  by an increase
in public saving rates, then the prospects for an increase in national saving
rates  will be much reduced.  The effect of public saving on national saving is
an empirical question which is the main focus of this paper.
The rest of the paper is divided into 5 sections.  Section 2 reviews the
evidence on saving and investment rates in a group of 13 developing countries.
Next a two-step approach is followed to analyze the impact of public policies,
and  particularly of  public saving,  on  private saving.  First,  section 3 provides
evidence  on the  importance  of liquidity  constraints affecting  consumption  levels
in developing countries and thus gives indirect support to the notion that an
increase in public saving does not result in an equal reduction in private
saving.  The second step, in section 4, provides direct evidence on tS'e  link
between  private  consumption  and  government  saving  using  a  more  general
consumption specification.  Section  5 analyzes the implications  of our findings
for the design of policies to promote an increase of national saving.  Section
6 presents the  main conclusions.-3-
2.  Savint  and  Investment  Rates:  A First  Lock
Table  1  presents  data  on  average  saving  and  investment  rates  in  a  group  of
13 countries,  8 of them  in  Latin  America. The  average  national  saving  rate  in
this sample  of developing  countries  dropped  substantially  up to 1982-83  and
started  a  slow  and  partial  recovery  thereafter.  The  average  foreign  saving  rate
reached  its  peak in 1981  and  then decreased  substantially  reaching  its lowest
value  in  1986. Jross  domestic  investment  also  reached  its  peak  in 1981  and  then
decreased  continuously  thereafter  reaching  its  lowest  value  in 1984. From  1981
to 1987  the  average  gross  domestic  investment  rate  of these  countries  increased
almost  2  percentage  points  of  GDP. The  recovery  of  national  saving,  starting  jn
1984, is caused  by some increase  in public  saving  and a strong  recovery  of
private  saving  rates,  which  have  risen  by  more than  3  percentage  points  of GDP
since  1983.
We conclude  from  this  preliminary  evidence  that  for  developing  countries,
in  the  short  run,  the  evolution  of  the  national  saving  rate  is  mostly  accounted
by movements  in the  private  saving  rate  and to a  lesser  extent  by changes  in
public  saving.  To  different  degrees,  both  private  and  public  saving  rates  appear
to be procyclical. This suggests  that variations  in public  saving  are not
(entirely)  offset  by private  saving  changes.
In  the  following  two  sections  we  examine  this  evidence  in  a  more  systematic
way using  individual  country  data  and  controlling  for  other  factors.
3.  Is there  Evidence  of  Liquidity  Constraints?
In  assessing  the  effect  of  public  policies,  and  particularly  public  saving,
on  private  saving,  we follow  a  two-step  approach.  First,  in  this  section  we test
the  periuanent  income  hypothesis  by comparing  the  sensitivity
re-:  t- 4 -
Table  1
SAVING AND INVESiMENT RATES IN 13 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: !980-87
(X  of  GDP)
Private  Public  National  Foreign  Gross Dom2estic
Saving  Saving  Saving  Saving  I  n  v  e  s  t  me n  t
1980  8.3  9.4  17.6  4.9  22.5
1981  7.7  8.0  15.7  7.4  23.1
1982  6.2  7.4  13.6  7.0  20.6
1983  5.9  7.2  13.1  4.9  18.0
1984  6.6  7.8  14.3  2.9  17.3
1985  6.4  8.3  14.8  2.7  17.5
1986  7.7  7.6  15.3  2.2  17.5
1987  9.3  7.3  16.7  2.8  19.5
Notes:
(i)  The Latin American  countries are: Argentina, Brazil,  Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Mexico,  Peru, Venezuala, and  the non-Latin  countries are
Ghana, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
(ii)  The ratios are calculated as unweighted averages of country current price
data.
(iii)  The sources  for  national  saving, foreign  saving, gross  domestic investment
and GDP is the Andrex Data Base of the World Bank.  See appendix 2.
(iv)  Public savirg is computed as revenue minu.s  expenditures --  excluding the
inflation component  of domestic debt --  of the consolidated  non-financial
public sector.- 5  -
of  private  consump:ion  to  permanent  in'  me with  its  dependence  on  current  income
and  liquid  wealth  in  developing  countries.  If  and  by  how much  consumers  react
to  current  inicome  and  asset  holdings  sheds  indirect  light  on  the  effectiveness
of  fiscal  policies  'n  raising  aggregate  saving  by  increasing  public  saving.
Section  4  pursues  the  aecond  step,  by  analyzing  the  sensitivity  of  private
consumption  to  a  broader  set  of  income  measures,  public  policies  and  relevant
prices.
Following  Hayashi  (1982)  we  assume  the  existence  of  two  types  of
consumers.  The  first  group  is composed  by  rational  intertemporal-optimizing
individuals  whose  stationary  consumption  levels  follow  Hall's  (1978)  random  walk
process  consistent  with  the  permanrnt  income  hypothesis  (PIH).  The  second  group
makes  its  consumption  decisiona  influenced  by  current  income  and  liquid  asset
holdings,  because  it  either  faces  liquidity  constraints  or  is  uncertain  abou:  its
permanent  income  levels. 2
The following  reduced-form  equation  reflects  aggregate  cons-amption  behavior
derived  by  adding  the  consumption  processes  for  the  two  groups  (Appendix  1
presents  the  derivation  of  the  corresponding  structural  form):
(  1)  C,  =  6o +  6, ct- 1 +  62  Yt  - 03  yt-l  +  64  mt  - 95  6t-I  +  Vlt
where  c  is  private  consumption,  y  is  income,  m is  the  sum of  monet  and  quasi-
monetary  asset  holdings  (broad  money),  v,  is  a  stochastic  error  term,  and  t  is
a  time  index.  All  variables  are  real,  per  capita  values  referred  #.o  the
aggregate  economy.
'Montiel  anl  Haque  (1987)  and  Corbo  and  de  Melo  (1989),  among  others,  have
used  a  similar  assumption  to  test  for  the  presence  of  liquidity  constraints.
2  Uncertainty  referred  to  permanent  income  or  wealth  levels  due  to  the  fact
that  income  does  not  follow  a  stable  time  series  process  and  hence  future  income
levels  are  hard  to  predict  leads  to  static  or  adaptive  expectations  of  future
variables  even  if  consumers  are  rational  forward-looking  optimizers  who  ao  not
face  liquidity  constraints  (see  Schmidt-Hebbel,  1987).  This  type  of  uncertainty
seems  to  be  a  relevant  characterization  of  income  processes  subject  to  disparate
foreign  and  domestic  policy  shocks,  observed  in  many developing  economies  during
the  eighties.- 6 -
Under  the  permanent  income  hypothesis  in  Its  simple,  consumption  random-
walk  version,  the  coefficient  d,  is 1  and  all  other  coefficiei.cs  are  zero. The
simple  Keynesian  theory  and  the  uncertain  permanent  income  hypothesis  postulate
that  60  and  02 are  positive  while  the  remaining  coefficients  are  zero. Cash-in-
advance  and  other  liquidity  constraint  hypotheses  add  money  to  current  income  as
consumption  determinants,  implying  that 6,  is added to 00  and 02 as positive
coefficients  under  the  null  hypothesis.
However,  more than  focusing  on these  extreme  and  partial  hypotheses,  our
interest  resides  in deriving  and comparing  the coefficients  - which a priori
could  all  bo significantly  different  from  zero  - to shed  light  on the  relative
role of permanent income,  current income and monetary-financial  assets in
determining  private  consumption  in developing  countries.
Equation  (1)  was estimated  for  a sample  of 13  developing  countries
which  jointly  represent  91Z  of the  region's  GNP in 1988.3 Table  2.1  reports
the country  by country  results  for  annual  data  covering  the 1968-1988  sample
period  obtained  from  two-stage  least  squares  estimations.4  The  results  tend  to
confirm  the  joint  existence  of the  two  consumer  groups  as embodied  in equation
(1).  Income  and/or  money are significant  consumption  determinants  in all
countries  and  lagged  consumption  is significant  in  9 countries.
Country  results  differ  widely from each other  with respect  to
significancy  levels  and  magnitudes  of the  5 determinants;  they  are  all
individually  significant  in  Chile  and  Colombia  only.  However,  Hall's  random
walk hypothesis  is  widely  rejected  in 11  countries,  and  marginally  rejected  in
Argentina  and  Zimbabwe,  as  reflected  by  the  log-likelihood  ratio  test  statistics
in  the  last  column.
'  The  countries  are  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico,
Peru, Venezuela,  Ghana, Pakistan,  Philippines,  Thailand  and Zi.mbabwe. For
variable  definitions,  data  sources  and  transformations  see  appendix  2.
'This  instrumental  variables  method  was  applied  because  of  potential  biases
due  to the  presence  of the  lagged  dependent  variable  and  current  income  in the
right-hand  side. See  table  2.1  for  the  instruments  used  here.- 7-
Table 2.1
CONSWff10N1N  DEV WMIG  I0UNhES  196-8-1988)
ou  tSy  L  eatimation)
Dependent  Variable:  Per  Capita  Private  Consumption  (c)
C.ountry  Const.  c..i  y  y. 1 w  M.1  AR(I)  DW  RBAR2  LRT
1.  Argentina  836.2  0.45,  0.12  0.03  0.39  -0.20  - 1.90  0.49  14.3
(IO./)  (0.7)  (0.3)  (0.1)  (1.9)  (-0.9)
2. Brazil  35.1  0.34  0.55  -0.08  -0.26  0.2.  - 2.59  0.99  33.4
(0.5)  (0.5)  (3.5)  (-0.2)  (-1.0)  (0.8)
3. Chile  -197.9  1.20  0.60  -0.65  0.56  -0.67  - 2.44  0.77  22.1
(-0.6)  (3.1)  (3.4)  (-1.7)  (2.2)  (-2.4)
4. Colobia  24.9  0.81  0.40  -0.26  0.77  -0.93  - 2.16  0.997  38.1
(1.4)  (4.78)  (4.4)  (-1.6)  (3.5)  -4.9)
5. Costa,  Rica  -104.6  1.09  0.82  -0.82  -0.19  0.19  - .1.'9  0.90  29.1
(-0.6)  (3.3'  (3.6)  (-2.7)  (-0.6)  (0.6)
6.  Mexico  135.7  0.60  0.44  -0.20  0.34  -0.42  - 2.16  0.99  54.4
(2.1)  (2.9)  (5.8)  (-1.6)  (2.9)  (-2.5)
7. Peru  21.7  1.25  0.75  -0.88  0.15  -0.50  - 1.84  0.66  16.3
(0.1)  (3.3)  (2.7)  (2.4)  (0.2)  (-0.6)
S. Venezuela  219.3  0.79  -0.11  0.12  1.20  -1.03  - 1.00  0.66  22.9
(0.3)  (3.0)  (-0.4)  (0.5)  (4.7)  (-3.9)
B.A. Venezuela  457.0  0.55  -0.16  0.18  1.38  -0.96  0.61  1.58  0.76  -
(AR1,1969-88)  (0.8)  (2.0)  (-C.9)  (0.9)  (6.9)  (-2.6)  (2.1)
9.  Ghana  215.5  0.47  0.66  -0.40  -0.22  0.33  - 2.85  0.94  43.4
(1.4)  (0.9)  (4.5)  (-0.9)  (-0.4)  (0.9)
9.A  Ghana  - 26.6  1.00  0.78  -0.83  -0.36  0.54  -0.66  2.36  0.96
(ARI,1968-88)  (0.2)  (2.4)  (8.7)  (-2.4)  (-1.0)  (2.0)  (-0.5)
10.  Pakistan  12.7  0.27  0.76  -0.08  -0.55  0.22  - 1.36  0.96  25.8
(1.0)  (0.4)  (3.7)  (-0.1)  (-2.5)  (0.7)
I0.A  Pakistan  17.8  0.34  0.82  -0.26  -0.54  0.30  0.29  1.82  0.96  -
(ARI,  !969-88)  (0.9)  (0.5)  (4.1)  (-0.4)  (-2.4)  (0.8)  (0.2)
11.  Philippines  -7.7  0.89  0.23  -0.15  -0.05  0.03  - 1.85  0.98  27.1
(-0.5)  (12.5)  (3.6)  (-2.2,  (0.4)  (0.3)
12.  Thailand  11.2  0.81  0.36  -0.24  0.05  -0.05  - 2.20  0.996  36.5
(0.4)  (1.6)  (5.7)  (-0.8)  (0.5)  (-0.4)
13.  Zimbabwe  -31.8  1.45  0.68  -1.15  -1.00  1.93  - 2.44  0.82  15.2
____  _____ .. 1&  -0.3)  (3.2)  (2.7)  k-2.6)  (-1.1)  (1.6)
M  ~~~The  specif...ation  corresponds  to equation  (1).
(ii)  ~Two  stage  least  squares (TSLS)  was used to intrumor  -alize  the lagged  dependent  variable (c.. 1) anid
current income (y  ,  using  the following  four instrurments:  per cinpita  gross domestic  investment,
exports,  and the se11cond  lags  of income  and money.
(iii)  ~  Liaies  1-8  present  results  for  all countries,  based  on T'SLS  without first-order  serial  correlation
(ARI). Equationc  B.A. 9.A  and I0.A  present  results  'or  TSLS  with AR(1)  estima4tions;  corresponding
equations for  the other 10 countries rendered non-significant  first-order  serial correlation
coefficients.
(iv)  t-statistices  are in parenthesis.  DW  is the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  and RBAR2  is the adjusted  R
2.
The same format  is used in the other  tables.
(v)  LRT is  !:he  log likelihood  ratio  test  statistic  computed  for  Hall's  null  hypothesis  that  crnly  c- 1 is
significant,  based on the  difference  between  log likelihood  values  of the above results  and those
of  the restricted  specifications.  The corresponding  value of the  X2  distribution for a  1%
confidence level  and 4  degrees  of freedom  is  13.3.-8-
Table  722
CONSUMPTION  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRIESJJ13  COU IES.  1968-1988)
(xe  Iecta  ne  ctiation)
Dependent Variablei  Per  Capita  Private  Conaunption  (c)
c  1  y  y.i  m  m 1  EW  RBAR2  FT
1.  Panel  Umweighted  LS  0.85  0.25  -0.20  0.50  -0.44  1.79  0.74  66.7
(16.6)  (5.0)  (.3.5)  (9.0)  (-7.2)
2.  Panel  Weighted  LS  0.78  0.27  -0.15  0.43  -0.43  1  '0  0.95  92.0
(16.8)  (7.8)  (-3.6)  (8.0)  (-7.1)
Dependent  Variable:  Change  in  per  capita
private  consumption  Ac  *  c-c-l
ay  6m  DW  RUM.R2
3,  Panel  Unweighted  LS  0.36  0.49  2.06  0.46
(7.9)  (9.2)
4.  Panel  Weighted  IS  0.41  0.30  2.09  0.54
(12.9)  (5.8)
Notes:
i)  The specification  corresponds  to  equation  (1).
(ii)  Fitted,  not actual,  values for lagged  private  consumption  and current  GNP  values
were used  for  c.,  and  y, respectively,  to  account  for  their  potential  correlations
with the  residuals. The  fitted  values  were  obtained  from  regressing  acrual  c-l  and
y  on the same 4 instruments  used in the country-by-country  estimations  of table
2.1,  mentioned  in  the  note  to that  table.
(iii)  The  t-statistices  were  corrected  using  the  variance-covariance  matrix  corresponding
to the  actual (and  not fitted)  values  of c, and  y.
(iv)  The weighted LS  panel results correspond to the specification  with weighted
residuals  to take care of heteroskedasticity  resulting  from combining  different
country  data.
(v)  FT is the F-test  statistlic  computed  for  Hall's null hypothesis  that only cl is
significant,  based  on  the  differences  between  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  R's.
The corresponding  value of the  F  distribution for  a 12  confidence  level  is  3.1.
(vi)  Results  for  estimations  with Seemingly  Unrelated  Regressions  (SUR)  technique  were
similar  to those  presented  above:
c  1 y  y;.  m  m  ,
0.80  0.28  -0.21  0.47  -0.42
(23.0)  (15.5)  (-8.1)  (17.2)  (-17.3)-9-
Table 2.2 preseiits  fixed--effects  panel estimation  results for the 13
countries,  for both unweighted  and weighted  least squarei (lines  1 and 2.
respectively),  the  latter  to  take  care  of  heteroskedasticity  stemnming  from  having
a  different  variance for the random error of the equation  for different
countries. 5 Each consumption  determinant  contributes  vecy significantly  to
private  consumption  in the  sample  of developing  countries  during  1968-88.
Similar  conclusions  were reached  using the seemingly  unrelated  regressions
technique,  with cross equation  restrictions6.  The colksumption  random walk
hypothesis  is  strongly  rejected,  as  reflected  by  the  F-test  values. While  lagged
consumption  as a  proxy  for  the  permanent  income  hypothesis  has  a  high  value,  it
differs  significantly  from  unity,  and  current  income  and  money  are  additional,
important  determinants  of  consumption.  On the  other  hand,  the  extreme  Keynesian
hypothesis  and  the  money  liquidity  constraint  hypothesis  are  also  separately  and
jointly  rejected  as  the  only  determinants  of consumption.'  The same  conclusion
may be reached  with the panel data estimations  for the first difference  of
consumption  as a linear  function  of the first  differbnce  of income  and  money
(table  2.2 lines  3 and 4).  Hence  private  consumption  in developing  countries
seems  to conform  to  the  existence  of (at  least)  two  distinct  groups  of private
aSents,  as reflected  by  equation (1). The significant  role  of current income  and
real  mcney ir,  private  consumption  is a  first,  indirect  evidence  that fiscal
policies,  and  particularly  changes  in public  saving,  are not fully  offset  by
changes  in  private  sa'.'ing.  Our  next sec.ion  is devoted  to obtain  more direct
evidence  on  how  much  does  the  private  sector  react  to  changes  in  fiscal  policies.
However,  the  values  of the coefficient  for lagged  consuimption  far  away
from  one  create  some  doubts  on  the  interpretation  of  the  estimations.  In  general
'To  address  the  potential  biases  stemming  from  including  lagged  consumption
and  current  income,  we used  fitted  (not  actual)  data for  these  two  variables,
obtained  from  running  first-stage  regressions  as  explained  in  note (ii)  of  table
2.2.
6See  note (vi)  in  Table  2.2.
'The  corresponding  test  statistics  were  not  presented  in table  2.2.- 10  -
these  results should  be taken  with caution  for two  main reasons.  First, the  main
source of variation in the right hand side variables is likely to be common
across regressors making almost  impossible the identification of individual
coefficients (although combination of them will be identified).  Second, the
individual t-statistics should also be taken with caution.  These two problems
are more important in small samplas.  To a%oid in part these problems we also
worked with first differences in the variables in Lhe panel data estimation.
However, the results shown in lines  3 and 4 of table 2.2 also strongly support
the hypothesis that liquidity  and  wealth constraints are important determinants
of ccasumption in developing eountries.
4.  Private ConsumRtion and Public Policies
This section broadens the empirical analysis carried out up to here by
specifying a framework to address directly the effects of public policies on
consumption in developing countries.
Direct effects  of fiscal  policies on  consumption  or saving  operate  through
public saving (or  the deficit) and  its composition.  If the stringent  conditions
requlred for  Ricardian equivalence are satisfied (i.e.  if the private sector is
rational  forward  looking  satisfying  the  PIH,  and  is  able  or  willing  to
incorporate  the intertemporal  public  budget constraint into its own), a rise in
public saving, if it is done  via lower public spending, is exactly offset by an
increase in private consumption.  As disposable income does not change, the
reduction in private saving matches the increase in public saving.  A rise in
public saving does not affect private consumption at all if it is made possible
via higher taxes.  But as disposable income is redu_.ed  by the size of the tax,
the reduction in  private saving  also matches the increase in public saving (the
latter being macroeconomically equivalent to issuing more public debt).  The
opposite results are predicted by the Keynesian (and permanent income  without
Ricardian  equivalence)  hypothesis:  current  (permanent)  taxes  matter  for
consumption, not current (permanent)  public spending levels.
The Ricardian  hypothesis  has  been  widely rejected  in  empirical  studies  for- 11 -
industrialized countries.  Most  of  these studies identify the existence of
pervasive borrowing constraints as the main cause for its rejection.'  A study
for a set of developing countries by Montiel and Haque  (1987) tests for two
different causes which could explain a deviation from Ricardian equivalence:
higher private than government discount rates (due to Blanchard-
Yaari infinite-lived households facing a mortality probability) and liquidity
constraints.  They find significant evidence for the latter  causing a deviation
from Ricardian equivalence without much  support for the  former.  Borrowing
constraints, proxied by current income or financial asset holdings, are also
major  determinants  in  the  cross-developing  country  studies  for  private
consumption and household saving by Rossi (19V8)  and Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and
Corsetti (1990),  respectively.
Indirect  effects  of  public  (fiscal-monetary)  policies  on  private
consumption operate via the impact of public deficits and their financing on
major prices affecting  private consumption: real interest  rate3, inflation, and
the real exchange rate.  Real interest rates affect private consumption
only if  the  well-known substitution,  income  and  wealth effects  do  not cancel  each
other.  This seems not to be the case, judging from the growing evidence  which
shows  that  consumption  is not  sensitive  to  real  interest  rates.9  While
inflation's  first order  effect is  on the composition  of the stock of savings  and
not on saving  or consumption, it  may have second-order  effects reducing  measured
saving if it is associated to capital flight or flight into consumer durables,
a  For Ricardian equivalence to hold, the main conditions to be satisfied
jointly are: absence of iiquidity constraints, equal rates of discount for the
public and  private sectors,  and  certainty  on  future  ir.come,  tax  and  public sector
expenditure flows.  For a further discussion of these conditions and surveys of
the empirical studies see Hayashi (1985), Bernheim (1987), and Leiderman and
Blejer (1989).
'Among  the studies on the interest-insensitivity of saving in developing
countries see, for instance, Giovannini  (1985) and Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and
Corsetti (1990).  For an alternative view, see Fry (1988)  and Balassa (1989).
The cancellation of income and substitution effects of real interest rates on
consumption  was confirmed  in  Southern  Cone  countries  by  Schmidt-Hebbel (1987)  and
Arrau (1989),  who obtained  elasticities  of intertemporal  consumption  substitution
in the neighborhood of 1.- 12 -
or  increasing actual  (precautionary) saving  if it  raises uncertainty.  An
expected  devaluation reduces the consumption-based real interest rate and leads
to capital flight - the first effect could increase actual consumption while
capital flight  raises  the  measured consumption  to income  ratio if  capital flight
reduces  measured income.'°
Monetary policy and financial  reform affect  the aggregate of  monetary and
quasi-monetary  assets.  Broad  money increases  consumption  because it  reduces the
extent of liquidity constraints (as discussed in section 3), and is a major
component of financial  wealth.
Finally,  and  less related  to direct  public policies,  foreign saving
impacts on private consumption when it is a  (partial) substitute for private
saving in a regime of binding foreign resource constraints.
Let's  start the discussion of a relevant framework for assessing the
impact  of  public policies on  private consumption  by referring to  a standard form
for testing the Ricardian equivalence proposition, based on Bernheim's (1987)
survey:
(2)  Cpt  =  a0 +  ct,  (YNt  - Tt  +  it  D,)  +  a2  (Tt  - EGt - it  Dt)  +
+  4 Dt  +  5  Wt  +  V2t
where C.  is private consumption, YN is national income, T is tax revenue  net of
transfers and subsidies to the private sector, i is the nominal  interest rate,
D is government domestic debt, EG is public spending,  W is private wealth  (net
of  governmenc  domestic debt),  and v 2 is  a stochastic  error  term.  Hence the first
right-hand  determinant is  private  disposable  income  and the  second  is  the  nominal
or total government surplus.
Three simple null hypotheses can be tested  with this spec  .fication:
(i)  Keynesian hypJthesis :  a0  >  °, a 1 >,  other coefficients 0;
10  For  the  theory  and  the  Latin  American  experience  on  the  role  of
consimption-based  real  interest  rates  on  intertemporal  consumption  allocation  see
Dornbusch (1983, 1985),  and for the relation between saving and capital flight
see Dornbuscb (1989).- 13 -
(ii)  Permanent income hypothesis without Ricardian equivalence:
a  > 0, as  >  0, other coefficients 0;
(iii)  Ricardian equivalence hypothesis: a, =  a2 >  01  other coefficients
equal to 0.
This  standard  specification presents various  shortcomings."  First,
public saving and not the public surplus should be the relevant determinant in
equation  (2), because  public investment adds to real capital  and therefore
constitutes  "net  wealth"  in the  sense  of  Barro  (1974). Second,  under  inflation
only  the  real  component  of domestic  interest  payments  should  enter  both  private
disposable  income  and  the  government  surplus  (saving)"
2. Third,  permanent,  not
current  private  disposable  income  and  public  surplus  (saving)  should  enter  (2)
for a fair test of the  Ricardian  proposition. Fourth,  additional  potential
consumption  determinants,  such  as  foreign  payments  and  the  real  interest  rate  or
inflation,  should  be included. Finally,  the role  played  by the  public  sector
surplus  may  not  reflect  Ricardian  behavior  but  could  obey  to  direct  crowding-out
effects  and  to institutional  arrangements  by which  the  public  sector  captures
private  saving  either  directly  or through  the  domestic  financial  markets. As
both hypotheses  are  not  distinguishable,  one  should refer to  the joint
Ricardian/direct  crowding-out  hypothesis  when introducing  the public  sector
surplus as a private consumption determinant.
The  following  specification  for  the  private  consumption  to  private
disposable  income ratio  takes care  of  the above mentioned  shortcomings of
equation  (2). In  addition,  the  scaling  to  private  disposable  income  reduces  the
extent of non-stationarity of the time series and makes  cross-country data
comparable.  Hence  the  private  consumption  rate  is  specified  as:
"  Bernheim  (1987)  addresses  the third  and fourth  limitations  discussed
below.
12  The inflation  component  of interest  payments  on the  public  debt,  which
compensates  for  the  loss  in  principal  due  to  inflation,  is  put  back into  public
bond  holdings  by private  investors.  For  a further  discusaion  see  Tanzi  et  al.
(1987).- 14 -
Cpt  PDYt  PS5,  Ml
(3)  - go  +  B  +  92  +  B3  rt  +  B,  INFT  +  gs  +
DYp,  DY,t  DY,,  DYp,
FSt
+  - +  V3t
DYpt
where  DYP is  current private  disposable  income, PDYP is  permanent  private
disposable income, PS,  is permanent public saving, r is the real interest rate.
INF  is domestic inflation, M is broad money, FS  is foreign saving, and V3  is a
stochastic error term.
Permanent  private  disposable  income and  permanent  public  saving  are
consistent  with the  following  definitions  for  their  corresponding  current  values:
(4)  DYpt  5  GDPt  - NFPIt  - T,  + rt  Dt
(5)  S t  E  Tt  - CGt  - NFPGt  - rt  D,
where GDP is gross domestic product, NFPp is net foreign payments made by the
private sector, SG is current public saving, C.  is public consumption, and NFP 0
is net foreign payments made by the public sector.
Note that now the coefficients  go,  9,,  and  B2  in equation (3)  reflect  more
appropriately  the  Keynesian,  permanent  income,  and  Ricardian'direct  crowding  out
hypotheses, respectively.  According to the definition in (4),  public saving is
now consistent  with the operational  public deficit  concept.  Under the  Ricardian
hypothesis, g,=g 2,  and hence the Ricardian permanent private dis?osable income
concept results from adding PDY and  PSG,  which is permanent  GDP net of  permanent
total net foreign payments and permanent public consumption.  Under the direct
crowding-out  hypothesis, I,  is  positive and could  easily be larger  than go  or I1.
Using a data set for operational  non-financial  public sector deficits for
the 1980-87  sample  of 13  developing  countries  introduced  in  section  2,  we proceed- 15  -
to  estimate  equation  (3)  for  that  sample."  Due  to  the  brevity  of  the  available
time  series  we  are restricted  to  a  panel  estimation.  Table  3.1  presents  the
estimation  results  for  a  fixed-effects  weighted  least  squares  panel.  The  results
differ  by  the  assumptions  made  on  permanent  public  saving."  the  inclusion  of
the  rates  of  real  interest  and  inflation,  money,  and  period-dummies  for  1980-82
or  1980-83."  16
The results  tend  to  be  quite  robust  to  the  different  specifications
and  estimation  methods.  While  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of  current
private  disposable  income  hovers  around  0.60  (the  fixed-effect  constants,
mentioned  in  footnote  16,  vary  between  0.49  and  0.79,  depending  on  each  country),
the  propensity  to  consume  out  of  permanent  income  is  significantly  lower,  varying
around  0.24.  Therefore  there  is  only  partial  evidence  for  intertemporal
consumption  smoothing  in  these  developing  countries:  for  each  percentage  point
increase  in  current  (transitory)  income  vis-a-vis  permanent  income,  the  private
consumption  rate  declines  by  one  fourth  --  much  less  than  the  1.0  fall
predicted  by  the  PIH.
Private  consumers  respond  to  long-term  or  "permanent"  public  saving.
however,  by  much  less  than  the  1.0  coefficient  predicted  by  either  the  Ricardian
or  direct  crowding-out  propositions.  Nonetheless,  the  impact  of  public  saving
is  sizable:  for  each  $1  increase  in  public  saving,  private  consumption
"On  variable  definitions,  sources  and  transformations  see  appendix  2,  which
also  presents  in  table  Al  country-by-country  time  series  of  operational
consolidated  non-financial  public  sector  deficit,  public  saving,  private  saving,
and  private  disposable  income,  all  scaled  to  GDP.
"  Under  the  first  hypothesis  of  partial  forward-looking  expectations,  PS.,
is  constructed  as  an  arithmetic  average  of  current  and future,  actual  public
saving,  two  periods  into  the  future,  while  under  the  static  expectations
alternative  current  public  saving  is  used  (See  appendix  2).
"The  1980-82  (1980-83)  dummies  test  for  a  structural  break  in  1983  (1984)
due  to  the  eruption  of  the  debt  crisis  and/or  domestic  recessions,  not
sufficiently  captured  by  the  changes  in  the  business  cycle  (PDYp/DYp)  and  foreign
saving  (FS/DYp).  The  dummies  are  1  for  1980-82  (83),  0  otherwise.
"The  fixed-effect  coefficients  for  each  country,  corresponding  to  the
estimations  of  table  3.1,  are  available  on  request.- 16  -
Table  3.  1
PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  (13  COUNTRIES.  198-1987)
(Fixed-Effects  Weighted Least Squares Panel  Estimatlon)
Dependent  Variable:  Private  Consumption  to Private  Disposable
Income  Ratio  (Cp/DYp)
PDT  PSG  r  INP  I  Fs  D  y  IU2  DW
D2  DY-  DTP  "P
1.  forward  Leokin& PSo
1.1  Con  l1te  Se  icfic at ion
AlWE64W11i_la  0.260  0.461  0  008  -0.026  -0.013  0.425  --  .52  1.09
(4.9)  (7.5)  (0.6)  (-0  7)  (-0.3)  (7.2)
1.2  Dlgteo  ecification  )  .226  0.417  -0.006  -0.030  0.057  0.463  -0.024  .46  1.24
(4.1)  (6.1)  (-0.5)  (-0.8)  (1.3)  (6.2)  (-3.3)
1.3  Co.plet.Spcilfieation
1.  80-83  ;if  iction  0.283  0.434  -0.001  -0.018  0.071  0.490  -0.021  .49  1.20
(5.1)  (6.4)  (-0.1)  (-0.5)  (-1.6)  (6.3)  (-2.9)
1.4  Partial  Sm9ification
Eliw Secii:stion0.241  0.473  0.413  1.I
(4.8)  (7.3)  (7.0)
1.5  Partlal  pecification
Duy  OV-0Z  (0.207  0.417  0.451  -0.019  .46  1.24
(4.1)  (6.2)  (6.2)  (-3.0)
1.6  aSrtifl  cification
Du=  O  j  0.256  0.422  0.465  -0.017  .47  1.18
(5.0)  (6.3)  (6.2)  (-2.7)
II. static  EXpectations  P
2.1  Cil*,te  Seciflcstiaon
without  Duu_iee  0.239  0.555  -0.011  -0.003  0.060  0.381  .55  1.11
(4.5)  (8.3)  (-1.0)  (-0.1)  (-1.8)  (5.7)
2.2  Co  ___tc  twc____ctl_n
D____  fctin  0.227  0  514  -0.018  -0.028  -0.112  0.398  -0.018  .49  1.18
(4.0)  (6.8)  (-1.7)  (-0 7)  (-2  6)  (3.1)  (-2.3)
2.3  ______________________
2  __3  _f_tn  C.265  0.504  0.015  -0.008  -0.110  0.420  -0.016  .50  1.16
(4.5)  (6.8)  (-1.3)  (-0.2)  (-2.6)  (5.1)  (-2.2)
2.4  Partial  Specification
nwo  DxAIM  0.237  0.497  0.393  .49  1.10
(4.7)  (7.2)  (6.0)
2.5  Partisl  S  pcification
p±i  V,  sa41  0.214  0.435  0.376  -0.010  .4.1  1.13
(4.1)  (5.6)  (4.6)  (-1.4)
2.6  Partialipcif1cation
s  80-81  lstio  V0.243  0.425  0.390  -0.009  .41  1.13
(4.4)  (5.5)  (4.9)  (-1.3)
Notes:
(i)  The specification  corresponds  to  equation  (3).
(ii)  The  weighted  least  squares  panel  results  correspond  to  a  specification  with  weights  to  take
care  of  heteroskedasticity  resulting  from  combining  different  country  data.
(iii)  Fitted  foreign  saving  values  and  not  actual  values  were  used  in  the regressions,  in  order
to address  the  possible  simultaneity  between  consumption  and the  current  account  deficit
during  1976-1981.  The regressore  of foreign  saving  were  lagged  foreign  saving,  permanent
income  over  actual  income  and lagged  permanent  income  over  actual  income.
(iv)  Different  specifications  with  dummies  for  Argantina  and  Venezuela  during  some  sub-periods
were  tried.  Although  the  improvement  in  fits  were  large  (RBAR2  around  .80),  there  were  only
slight  changes  in  the  values  of the  parameters.- 17  -
increases  (private  saving  declines)  by an average  $0.44 (under  the forward-
looking  hypothesis),  to $0.49  (under  the static  expectations  hypothesis). We
hypothesize  that  this  coefficient  reflects  both  direct  crowding-out  effects  of
public deficit financing  and Ricardian  behavior  of private consumers,  and
possibly  more the  former  than  the  latter.'
Real  interest rates, inflation rates, and  broad money  do  not  have
consistently  significant  influences  on  private  consumption  in  our  results.  Hence
lines  1.4-1.6  and  2.4-2.6  of  tables  3.1  present  results  omitting  these  variables.
The coefficient  of the  real  interest  rate  is negative  in most results,  but
never  attains  standard  acceptable  significance  levels. This  is  consistent  with
most  of  the  empirical  literature,  as discussed  above. Similarly,  inflation  has
a  non-significant,  small  and  negative  influence  or.  private  consumption.
Broad  money plays an ambiguous,  non-significant  role under the forward-
looking  specification. However,  it shows  a small,  negative  and significant
coefficient  under  the  static-expectations  alternative,  contradicting  our  priors
with regard  to its  sign.
Finally,  foreign  saving  has a major and consistently  positive  effect  on
private  consumption  in  our  sample  of 13  developing  countries.  According  to  the
results,  foreign  saving  is  a  partial  substitute  of  private  saving: for  each  $1
increase  in the current  account  deficit,  private  consumption  increases  by an
average  $0.42,  the remainder  financing  public consumption  or gross domestic
investment.
The  results  discussed  here  tend  to  reject  the  Keynesian,  permanent  income  and
Ricardian/direct  crowding-out  hypotheses  in  their  extreme  forms,  which exclude
all  other  theories.  In  fact,  there  is  strong  evidence  for  the  joint  contribution
of  Keynesian  cum liquidity  constraint  determinants  as  well as permanent  income
and  Ricardian/direct  crowding-out  elements  in explaining  developing  countries
private  consumption  in  the  eighties.  However,  it  is  more  illuminating  to  compare
17Direct  crowding  out  of  private  consumption  by  public  deficit  can  occur  in
countries  where the  public  sector  has  preferential  access  to resources  of the
private  sector.  This is the case in some of our sample  countr'es,  such as
Thailand  and  Zimbabwe.- 18  -
the  relative  magnitu.es  of the  significant  determinants  of private  consumption
or eaving  than  to stick  to the  straightforward  rejection  of sach  of the  simple
theories;  precisely  this  is one  of the  objectives  of the  next  sectior,
5.  Estimating  the  Effects  of  Public  Sector  Savino  on Private  Saving
To analyze  the impact  of public  saving  on private  saving  and hence on
national  saving,  we make use of the results  for  private  consumption  behavior
reported  in table  3.1  based  on equation  (3). Rewrite  equation  (3)  in terms  of
private  saving  levels  and  use the  coefficients  of table  3.1  for the  following
private  saving  equations:
(6.1) Sft - (1 - conos)  DYft  - 0.24 PDYft  - 0.47 PSr  - 0.41 FS,
(6.2) Sft - (1 - cons,)  DYft  - 0.24 PDYft  - 0.50  PSG,  - 0.39 FS,
where  the  coefficients  in (6.1)  are  the  estimated  parameters  presented  in line
1.4  of  table  3.1 (forward-looking  permanent  public  saving),  and  those  in (6.2)
are  consistent  with  the  parameters  of  2.4  (static-expectations  permanent  public
saving). The  country-specific  coefficient  consi  is  the  fixed-effects  parameter
for  country  i.
Table  4.1  computes  the  partial  effects  on  private  saving  of  various  changes
in  income  and  fiscal  policy  variables,  calculated  from  equations  (6.1)  and  (6.2)
after  substituting  the  identities  (4)  and (5). As already  discussed  in section
3, private  saving  (or  consumption)  in developing  count-'es  tends  to be more
sensitive  to  current  than  to  permanent  income  shocks,  with  corresponding  marginal
propensities  in  the  neighborhood  of  0.40  and  0.24,  respectively  (table  4.1,  lines
1  and  3).
For  each  $1  increase  in  "permanent"  or longer-term  public  saving,  achieved
by a 'permanent"  $1 decrease  in public  consumption,  private  saving  declines  by
47-50 cents - a far cry from the 1.0 offset coefficient  predicted  by the
Ricardian/direct  crowding-out  hypotheses  (lines  4 and  5).  If the "permanent"- 19 -
public  deficit  reduction  is achieved  by reducing  the long-term  tax burden,
private  saving  falls  by 23-26  cents  for  each  $1 increase  in  permanent  taxation
(line  6). Note  that  if  permantent  income  and  permanent  public  saving  had  the  same
coefficient,  which would be a necessary (but  not sufficient)  condition  for
Ricardian  equivalence  to hold,  the  effect  rf  long-term  taxes  on private  saving
would  be nil.
The responsiveness  of saving  to current  income  and fiscal  policy  shocks
depends  significantly  on how the private sector  forms its expectations  on
permanent  variables,  as can  bt seen  when comparing  the  propensities  in  columns
1  and  2  of table  4.1.
Hence  a $1 increase  in current  public  saving  (which  determines  expected
permanent  public  saving  fully  under  static  expectations  but only  partly  under
partial  perfect  foresight),  achieved  by reducing  current  public  expenditure,
reduces private saving by  16 to 50  cents, depending on  the  underlying
expectations.  However,  if  the  reduction  of  the  current  public  deficit  is  pursued
via increasing  current  taxes,  the effect  would be much stronger,  as a tax
increase  affects  current  and  expected  permanent  private  disposable  income,  in
addition  to permanent  public  saving.  For each $1 of higher current  taxes,
private  saving  declines  on  average  (through  countries)  48  or  65  cents,  depending
on  how  expectations  are  for  d.
From  the  empirical  results  we have  found  that  in  the  short  to  medium  term
an increase  in  public  saving  has  a strong  positive  effect  on national  saving.
However,  the  way in  which  the  increase  takes  place  --  incre&se  in  current  taxes
or decrease  in current  expenditures  --  and the  way by which expectations  are
formed,  affect  significantly  the  final  impact.
It is clecr  from our empirical  work that, in the short  to medium  run,
raising  public  saving  is the  most effective  and sure  way to increase  national
saving. Raising  public  saving,  for  a given  level  of public  investment,  also
contributes  to reduce  the  public  sector  deficit  and therefore  restores  macro
balances. Summers  (1985)  has  made  the  same  policy  recommendation  for  the  U.S.,- 20 -
Table  4.1
RESPONSE OF PRIVATE $AVING TO CHANGES;  IN PUBLIC SAVING,
pUBLIC EAPENDITURE AND TAXES
Marginal  Saving  Propensities  Marginal  Saving  Propensities
consistent:  with  Eq.  6.1  consistent  with  Eq.  6.2
dSpt  1-B]  - (0.29;0.50J  t1-3B0  - (0.28;0.49]
tDYPt
dS  P
2.  -313/3  - -0.08  0
dDYPt+ 1 (SE-0.02)
dS  P 3.  Pt  -B  - -0.24  -81  . -0.24
dPDYpt  1  (SE-O.05)  (SE-0.05)
4.  Pt  -32  - -0.47  -i2
dPSGt  (SE-0.08)  (SE-0.07)
Pt  B  - 0.47  B2  - 0.50
dPC  2  (SE-0.08)  (SE-00  7)
dS  P
6.  Pt  1-2  -- 0.23  8;-13  - -0.26
dPT  1  (SE-0.09)  (SE-0.09)
dS  Pt 
7  Pt  -B2/3  - -0.16  -B2  0 50
dS_G  (SE-0.02)  (SE-0.07)
8.  dSPt  /3  - 0.16  B  0.50
dC  2  (SE-0.02)  (SE-0.07)
dS  pt
. Ptt  -1- 0] + B1/3-  [1  a 1
dTt
a2/3 - [-0.58;-0.37]  - B2  - -0.75;-0.54]
Notes
(i)  SE corresponds  to the  standard  error  of  the  parameter(s).
(ii) Lines  1  and  9  show the minimum and maximum country fixed-effects
coefficients  cons,.- 21 -
qtoted  at the start  of this  paper.  Increasing  public  saving  helps  countries
experiencing  higher  inflation  and  unsustainable  current  account  deficits. For
countries  that  have  already  made  progress  in  stabilization  but  need  naw  to  start
growing  again,  raising  public  saving  --  for a given leve'l  of a sustainable
current  account  deficit  --  will be required  for achiaving  higher  investment
levels  (both  private  and  public).  The  problem  in  many  countries  is  to find  ways
of  raising  public  saving.  Here  most  countries  will  need  to  work  on  many  fronts.
First,  the  narrow  public  revenue  base  can  be extended  through  improving  tax
administration  and  the  introduction  of  broadly  based  uniform  rate  taxes,  such  as
VATs,  and  increased  reliance  on  user  charges  for  the  provision  of  public  services
with appropriate  compensation  schemes to protect the poor. Second,  public
expenditures  have to  be scrutinized  more  carefully  in terms  of their  costs  and
benefits. In  many  countries,  public  expenditures  should  be shifted  toward  high
priority, social and physical infrastructure  and away from ill-conceived
subsidies  and  low-return  capital  expenditure.  Third,  reforms  in  local  government
and state enterprises  are required.  Decentralizing  spending and revenue
authorities  can improve  the efficiency  of the public  sector  by having  a more
direct  link  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of  local  services.  Public  enterprises
can increase  their  contribution  to government  saving  by rationalizing  pricing
policies,  improving  their  efficiency  and a more careful  evaluation  of their
investment  projects.
6. Conclusions'e
The analysis  of this paper suggests  that if the objective  of developing
countries  is  to increase  their  national  saving  rate,  then  public  policy  could  be
used to reach  this  goal through  an increase  in government  saving.  From the
empirical  estimations  we found  that  a $1  transitory  increase  in  public  saving,
achieved  by cutting  current-period  public  expenditures,  reduces  private  saving
by 16  to 50 cents. However,  if the  same  increase  in  public  saving  is achieved
"The source  of the  data  mentioned  in  this  section  is  Easterly  (1989).- 22 -
by raising  current-period  taxes,  private  saving  declines  on average  between  48
to  65 cents. The  main  source  of  the  differential  effect  of reducing  government
expenditure  vis-a-vis  increasing  taxes  arises  from  the  effect  of tax increases
on  both  current  and  permanent  income  levels. For  lasting  public  sector  reforms,
it is  more important  to assess  the  effects  of  permanent  fiscal  policy  changes.
Not surprisingly,  higher  permanent  taxation  has a smaller  effect  on ptivate
saving  than that  of a transitory  tax  hikes  for  each  $1 increase  in  permanent
taxes,  private saving  declines  only by 23 to 26 cents.  Permanent  public
expenditure  cuts,  however,  reduce  private  saving  by  47-  50 cents  for each
dollar, tue to the full, combined  Ricardian/direct  crowding-out  effects  of
permanent  public  saving  on private  saving.
The  optimal  combination  of  tax increases  and  current  expenditure  reductions
will undoubtedly  depend  not  only  on these  coefficients  but  also  on the  initial
situation  of  each  country.  Cutting  inefficient  current  expenditure  is  - from  the
viewpoint  of growth  - the  most  beneficial  expenditure-side  method  of reducing
public  deficits.  For  instance,  Mexico  has  been  able  to reduce  the  share  of  non-
interest  current  government  expenditures  from  25.5%  of GDP  in 1982  to 20.2%  in
1987,  and  Chile  from  11.5%  of  GDP  in 1982  to  8.3%  of  GDP  in 1987. For  the  same
time  period,  Argentina's  share  went from  20.7%  to  23.1%  of GDP.
Increasing  taxes  and  improving  tax  compliance  are  the  most  efficient  methods
of reducing  public  deficits  when traditional  tax  revenue  is lo-  and  inefficient
tax  levies  (such  as the inflation  tax)  are  widespread  and  high.  In Brazil,  a
country  with  a  relatively  high  initial  tax  revenue  share  of  GDP,  traditional  tax
revenue  fell  from  25.  1%  in  1982  to  21.3%  in  1987,  while  inflationary  taxation  was
raised. Mexico,  on the  other  hand,  was  unable  to raise  significantly  its  low
traditional  tax  revenue  share  between  1982  and  1987,  increasing  it  only  from  9.9%
to 10.5%  of GDP.
Finally,  public  policy  can also make an important  contribution  to raise
measured private saving and  the  efficiency of  its use  by  providing a
macroeconomic  framework  in  which  inflation  is  low  and  incentives  are  predictable.- 23 -
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Appendix  I
This appendix  derives  a per capita  consumption  function  for an economy
composed  by two groups  of consumers. The first  group follows  Hall's (1978)
random  walk process  consistent  with the permanent  income  hypothesis,  and the
second is  either uncertain  about its permanent income level or liquidity
constrained  in its consumption  decisions.  All variables  are scaled  to the
population  size.  Hence per capita  consumption  of the unconstrained  private
sector  is given  by:
(Al)  cu  - a  cu  +eu t  ~t  -l  t
where  c  is  private  consumption,  e  is  a  stochastic  error  form  and  the  supraindex
u denotes  the  unconstrained  group. The  coefficient  a is  normally  equal  to 1.
Constrained  consumers  behave  as follows:
(A2)  cc  _  +  y+  6  me + EC
where  y is  private  income,  m is  monetary  and  quasi-monetary  assets,  and  the
supraindex  c denotes the aggregate  of constrained  and/or permanent  income-
uncertain  consumers.
Variables  referred  to  each  particular  group  are  unobserved,  while  aggregate
economy-wide  variables  are  observed.
Average  per capita  consumption  is a weighted  average of each groups'
consumption  levels:
(A3) ct  - s  cu + (l-p)  cc
where  p  is  the  share  of  the  consumption  constrained  population,  satisfying
o  < A  <  1.
Solve  (A3)  for  cU,  take  one lag  of the  latter,  substitute  it into (Al),
and  then  substitute  thetlatter  back into  (A3)  to  obtain:
(A4)  ct  - a ct_i + (I-p) cc - a(l-p) ct_  + U  pt
Per  capita  current  income  and financial  holdings  of the second  group  of
consumers  are  proportional  to  aggregate  per  capita  income  and  monetary  assets  as
followso
(A5) yc ,  A Yt
(A6) mct  p  mt- 26 -
where  A,  p >  0.
Substitute  (AS)  - (A6)  into  (A2),  and  the  latter  expression  into (A4)  to
obtain  finallys
(A7) ct - (1-a)  a  (1-0) +  a  ct_l +  (1-A) (  A) Yt - a  (1  ) (  A) Yte- +
+  (G-p)  (6p)  Mt-  a (1-) (6p)mt-i  +
*  I  u +  (I-p)  ef  - a (1-i')  et-l
Estimation  of (A7)  allows  to identify  the  following  (combinations  of)
parameters: a, B, A, (7A),  and (Sp).
Equation  (1)  of the  paper  is  the  reduced-form  equivalent  of (A7).
ADDendix  2
This appendix  discusses  variable definitions,  data sources and data
transformations  corresponding  to  the  variables  in  equations  (1)  and  (3). It  also
presents  the data series  for the  non-financial  public  sector  deficit,  public
saving, private saving, and private disposable  income used in the panel
estimation  of  equation  (3).
1.  Original Variables
The  following  original  variables  were  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  ANDREX
data base, (which  compiles  data from  U.N. National  Accounts,  IFS (IMF),  and
national  sources):
(a)  Current-Price  Local  Currency  Datat
Total  consumption,  money  and quasi-money,  private  consumption  and gross
domestic  product  and  gross  national  product,  both  at  market  prices.
(b)  1980  Constant-Price  Local  Currency  Data:
Government  consumption,  total  consumption,  gross  domestic  investment,  gross
national  product  at market  prices,  goods  and  non-factor  services  exports  and
private  consumption.
(c)  Population  Data:  Total  population.
(d)  Price  Data:  Period  average  exchange  rate.
The following  original  variables  were obtained  from  the  SAVEM  data  base,
World Bank (which  compiles  data from U.N. National  Accounts, among other
sources):
Current-?rice  Local  Currency  investment,  gross  national  saving  and  GDP.
The  source  of the  nominal  interest  rate  is the  IFS  data  bank,  IMP.
The  sources  for  the  operational  non-financial  public  sector  deficit  (Z  of
GDP, at  current  prices)  for  Latin  American  countries rest- 27 -
(a)  Argentina:  Kiguel,  M. and  N. Liviatan  (1989)  and  ECLAC  Project  on Fiscal
Policies,  Santiago,  Chile.
(b)  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico,  Peru and Venezuela:  ECLAC
Proiect  on  Fiscal  Policies.
The sources  for non-financial  public sector  investment  (S of GDP, at
current  prices)  for  Latin  American  countries  are:
(a)  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Costa  Rica and Venezuela:  ECLAC Proiect  on
Fiscal  Policies.
(b)  Colombia: Colombia  CEM,  World  Bank.
(c)  Mexico:  proportion  of Public  Investment/Gross  Domestic  Investment  at
constant  prices,  from  Banco  de  Mexico:  Indicadores  Econ6micos,  Dec.  1989)
applied  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Investment/GDP  share  (at  current  prices,  from
ANDREX,  World  Bank).
(d)  Peru:  proportion  of Public Investment/Gross  Domestic Investment  (at
constant  prices,  from  IDB:  Economic  and  Social  Progress  in  Latin  America,
1989,  Table  IX-2,  p.203)  applied  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Investment/GDP  share
(at  current  prices,  from  ANDREX,  World  Bank).
Additional country-specific  variables for  the  5  non-Latin American
countries  were obtained  from  the  following  sources:
(a)  Ghana:  non-financial  public sector  deficit  and public investmentiGDI
share  from  Islam  and  Wetzel  (1990).
(b)  Pakistan: public  sector  figures  from  Pakistan  Economic  Survey.
(c)  Philippines: public  sector  figures  were obtained  from  Easterly  (1989).
Figures  for  1980  were  not  available;  we  assumed  the  1981  proportion  to  GDP.
(d)  Thailand: public  sector  figures  were obtained  from  Easterly  and  Honohan
(1990).  Figures for 1980 were not available;  we  assumed the 1981
proportion  to  GDP.
(e)  Zimbabwe: figures  for  the  public  sector  were  obtained  from  Schmidt-Hebbel
(1990).
2. Transformed  Variables
2.1 For  Equation  (1)
The  per  capita  constant-price  (in  1980  US$)  series  for  c,  y, and  m  were
obtained  by dividing  local-currency  constant  price  private  consumption,  GNP  and
broad  money  (the  sum  of  money  and  quasi-money)  by  the  period-average  1980  nominal
exchange  rate  and  the  population.- 28 -
2.2  For  Equation  (3)
Current-Period  Variables
Current-price  public  saving  was obtained  by subtracting  the operational
non-financial  public  sector  deficit  from  non-financial  public  sector  investment.
To obtain  private  saving  next, either  foreign  saving  and public  saving  were
subtracted  from gross  domestic  investment  or public  savi,ig  was deducted  from
gross  national  saving. Private  disposable  income  is the  sum  of  private  saving
and  private  consumption.
Table  Al presents  the  13-country  1980-87  time  series  for  the  current-price
local  currency  GDP  shares  of  the  operational  non-financial  public  sector  deficit,
public  saving,  private  saving,  and private  disposable  income. Note that the
private  consumption/private  disposable  income  ratio,  which is the dependent
variable  in  equation  (3),  is  obtained  by  simple  transformations  of  the  two  latter
variables.
rermanent  Disposable  Income
For  the  estimate  of  permanent  private  disposable  income  at current  prices
(which  is  divided  by  current-period  private  disposable  income  at current  prices
in equation  3), first  real  private  disposable  is  obtained  by dividing  current-
price  private  disposable  income  (DY  )  by the  GNP deflator. Next, for  Brazil,
Colombia,  Pakistan,  Thailand  and Venezuela  constant-price  permanent  private
d.sposable income  (real  PDYp) wa'i obtained by  estimating the  1980-87
deterministic  trend.  For Argentina,  Chile,  Costa  Rica,  Ghana,  Mexico,  Peru,
Philippines,  and  Zimbabwe  the  trend  was  not  significant,  therefore  real  PDY,  was
defined  as the sample  arithmetic  average  of the real DYp series.  Finally,
current-price  permanent private disposable  income (PDYp)  was  obtained by
multiplying  the  real  PDYP  by the  GNP  deflator.
Permanent  Public  Saving
Two  extreme  alternatives  for  current-price  permanent  public  saving  (which
is divided  by current-period  private  disposable  income  at current  prices  in
equation  3)  were used  for  the  estimations.  The  first  one  is  a partial  forward
looking  option,  which  specifies  expected  long-term  public  saving  as  an  arithmetic
average  of actual  current  and  future  public  saving  levels,  two  periods  into  the
2
future:  PStG[  SGtl. /3  The  se'ond option corresponds  to  static
expectations:  PStw-St.
Inflation  and  Interest  Rates
The  inflation  rate,  corresponding  to  the  private  consumption  deflator,  was
normalized as follows: INF-(&Pct/P.t.,)I(l+&Pct/P.tel) 
The  real  interest  rate (r)  is  measured  ex-post  using  the  standard  Fisher
equation  :  r-(l+i)/(l+P,t/P,t_)-,  where  i'  is the  nominal  interest  rate.- 29  -
TABLE Al
Ogerational  fon-ainceial  Public  Soctor  Deficit 4 WH  OPr  or, current  prFcesi
AmC  3M  CHL  COL  CII  mt  PU  VI  GHA  PAZ  PHL  H&  ZWZ
1960  4.4  1.2  -:.4  2.5  12.7  6.1  3.9  -4.3  2.3  4.4  3.0  6.6  9.6
1961  6.2  5.4  -J.4  6.9  4.6  10.1  6.7  -0.6  0.7  4.1  3.2  6.7  5.9
1962  5.6  4.3  3.9  7.5  6.9  6.0  7.3  12.2  0.0  5.9  1.7  6.7  10.2
19os  6.6  3..  S.5  7.7  0.9  2.0  9.6  2.2  .2.4  5.6  2.4  5.3  7.0
1964  9.0  3.1  4.5  6.1  0.2  1.0  6.2  -10.1  -1.3  7.1  -2.6  5.5  15.4
1965  4.4  5.7  2.9  2.9  0.6  1.4  2.4  -6.9  0.6  7.6  -2.6  5.3  15.4
1966  2.0  3.6  1.5  2.6  2.0  4.7  4.9  1.4  -4.6  9.6  -2.3  3.3  6.2
1967  4.3  4.3  -0.3  -0.7  0.4  -0.5  6.5  -0.5  -5.7  9.4  .2.S  0.3  6.6
Public  !6ov4EA
(1  ol  CDr ot  currnr  price.)
"O  3M  CHL  COL  CII  mmX  PU  VW  GHA  PAK  PHL  T5A  ZWE
1960  4.7  6.5  10.6  5.2  0.5  4.6  5.1  20.2  4,6  15.5  11.7  16.9  14,5
1991  2.5  7.7  5.5  1.7  6.1  2.0  2.9  19.9  2.3  13.3  1.9  15.0  11.2
1992  2.5  4.6  0.  1.9  5.9  4.4  6.6  10.5  0.9  16.7  6.3  15.0  20.0
1963  0.2  3.2  1.3  1.1  10.4  4.6  3.4  13.6  .1.7  16.0  10.0  12.8  16.1
1964  .0.6  3.5  1.5  2.9  9.6  5.6  3.5  21.4  0.0  17.1  1.7  13.2  22.4
1965  2.2  3.3  4.2  6.7  6.7  5.4  6.5  15.  2.7  17.7  0.4  15.1  21.7
1986  5.1  7.4  9.2  5.9  10.1  1.  3  5.2  13.5  -2.9  20.4  1.3  10.3  14.0
1967  3.3  6.4  10.4  9.1  9.3  6.  1.3  12.9  -3.2  18.7  2.2  6.6  12.6
Privstes  S  kIn
(2  of  GCu  ^T  currnrprice)
A£2  BR  CEL  COL  Cli  .-  PU  VCU  GA  PAR  PHL  TA  ZES
90  14.1  9.2  5.5  14.6  11.5  17.5  17.6  13.0  -0.1  -9.6  13.2  2.4  0.0
1961  13.5  9.5  2.6  14.2  7.7  21.5  19.1  -0.3  1.4  -7.0  12.6  3.4  2.0
1962  11.0  10.9  0.5  11.2  6,5  16.1  15.6  S.4  2.5  -9.4  11.7  4.8  -8.5
1963  15.6  $.2  3.3  14.3  5.2  19.9  13.6  3.9  1.4  -9.0  .5  5.2  -9.2
1964  9.0  12.2  1.6  13.7  5.5  16.9  17.4  2.0  5.2  .10.6  12.6  6.2  -5.9
1985  4.9  13.3  1.5  12.1  5.5  17.1  15.4  7.5  3.2  -13.1  14.0  6.5  -3.5
19"6  0.4  9.5  -2.2  16.9  9.1  16.0  16.1  3.9  6.6  -11.5  15.8  11.6  5.1
19b7  2.0  15.4  2.6  11.0  10.5  15.2  15.9  9.4  8.4  -7.0  13.6  17.4  6.7
Prrivte  Diuosable  Incoe
(a  or  *jj~  at current  prices)
hAG  BR  CEL  COL  CHI  HEX  PU  Va9  GPA  PAK  PHL  THA  ZWE
1$.60  60.3  79.5  74.2  64.6  77.0  62.6  79.1  67.9  6,.6  73.3  60.5  69.0  64.5
1961  62.0  79.2  77.3  66.7  67.9  65.9  82.3  57.6  66.6  73.6  60.4  69.1  69.0
198^  79.7  61.2  75.  64.1  66.1  77.7  77.3  67.6  92.3  71.9  60.6  70.7  56.5
19  3  76.3  61.6  76.6  86.2  64.7  80.8  78.6  71.5  92.2  71.2  76.3  71.0  59.6
.984  62.5  83.0  74.6  64.5  66.6  79.6  79.9  64.4  91.1  69.4  67.4  71.6  53.3
1995  78.7  82.0  70.8  61.1  66.1  61.1  77.2  70.1  66.3  66.6  90.6  71.7  52.0
1986  77.5  78.2  66.7  64.1  68.4  83.7  83.6  72.5  69.4  64.6  91.5  77.0  59.6
1997  60.3  77.2  70.2  77,4  70.0  79.3  64.0  74.0  90.0  65.6  87.8  61.4  59.4PRE  Working  Pager  Series
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